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IMPROVE CRM AND ADVOCATE “ONE BALLOT VETO” 
1. Shi Ya-jie         2. Li Jing 
China Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology 
Beijing 100028，China 
Accident investigations showed that most accidents are caused by the flight 
crew. But in many cases, if the captain can listen to first officer or the observer 
suggestion, such as "go-around ", for safety reasons at the key phase of final approach, 
many flying accidents/incidents can be avoided. Unfortunately, the captain sometimes 
would still chose to continue the final approach due to over-confidence, then leading to 
disastrous consequences in the end. CRM(Crew Resource Management) endeavored to 
reduced the crew human errors and improve the safety level all the while, but there is 
no effective way to eliminate this kinds of problems at yet. In this paper, this kind of 
problems is deeply analyzed from some areas, such as the crew attitude, cultural 
characteristics, operation standards and regulations, etc. And recommended CAA to 
improve CRM by advocating the ‘One Ballot Veto’ system(—at the key phase of take 
off and approach, once someone argue against the current operation for the safety 
reason, the captain must hear the suggestions and take the operation which are more 
benefit to the safety at once), so that reduce these problems. 
The worst disaster in airline history occurred in Tenerife on March 27th, 1977 when a captain 
of a KLM 747 insisted on commencing a takeoff without clearance in a heavy fog even with the 
knowledge that a Pan Am 747 taxiing down the runway and had not yet reported clear of the runway. 
The first officer on KLM 747 had some doubts on whether the take-off clearance had been received 
and tried to convey his concerns to the captain, but the captain ignored his advice and pushed the 
power up without any hesitation which caused two Boeing 747 jumbo jets collided on the runway and 
583 people were killed[1]. Another instance was a Air China 767 crashed in Pusan, South Korean on 15 
April, 2002. During the final approach, the F/O’s advisory on immediate go around was not 
disregarded by the captain and hence the best opportunity to avoid flying into the terrain was missed[2]. 
Similar situation are very common among different incidents and accidents occurred in the world. 
What caused the captain rejecting safety recommendation from the other crew member and 
missed the last opportunity to break accident chain and eventually avoid the disaster? Why shouldn’t 
we take some measures to stop such tragedy? On the basis of analysis on some problems existed in 
CRM, a new concept-“one ballot veto” is proposed as well as some solutions are discussed in this 
paper. 
CRM Status 
The target of CRM is to achieve the highest level of efficiency and safety by making use of all 
available resources effectively. Since the conception of CRM was put forward in 1979, it has been 
developed and perfected all the way along to its fifth stage-“Threat and Error Management (TEM)”. 
Statistics shows it plays an important role in enhance flight safety and efficiency[3,4]. 
However, the following table (see Table 1) indicates that there are total amount of 323 fatal 
accidents happened world widely in last ten years together with a death toll of 8646, besides no 
remarkable decrease in the number of the accidents. Moreover, many investigation reports demonstrate 
more than 70% of the accidents are caused by human factors i.e. fatigue, decision mistake or ignoring 
automatic system warning, etc[4]. Therefore, to improve CRM, some problems need to be studied 
further. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Statistical Summary on Worldwide Fatal Accidents 1998-2007 
Year 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 Total 
Number of 
accidents 26 27 35 28 25 37 28 36 42 39 323 
Death toll 750 888 1059 429 679 1101 768 1082 671 1219 8646 
Note：1)Data in the above table is from ASN；2) Aircraft refer to multi-engine commercial airplanes 
with 14-seating or above. 
Among them, the problems related to CRM in the two accidents mentioned before is a kind of 
severe and unsolved one. One common feature involved in this type of accidents (or incidents) is that, 
during the critical point in approach and landing (or take-off), to deal with the abnormal situation 
appeared, one of the crew members (or ATC controller, GPWS system) propose some safety advice or 
alert (e.g. request for attention to altitude, go-around or take-off abortion etc), which are unfortunately 
discarded by the captain, who due to CRM defect keep on the wrong side of aircraft control or safety 
operation, missed the last chance to survive the mistake chain and consequently lead the disaster. 
According to Boeing company[5] (see Figure 1), most of the accidents are occurred at take-off 
and approaching to land. The number of the accidents happened during these two phases amounts 51% 
of the total, in contrast to the duration of the phases is only 6% of the total flight time. It is easily 
found that any CRM problem occurred during takeoff and landing are likely threaten flight safety 
seriously and resulted in fatal disaster. On the basis of accident chain theory, any interruption in the 
chain connection could prevent the accident from happening. As far as the accident or incident 
discussed in this paper, the final decision made by the captain is the last minute to interrupt the chain, 
but if the captain still persist in his fault even after the other member suggesting to go-around or abort 
take-off or warning triggered by onboard instruments, it is impossible to avoid the accident. As a result, 
how to solve such kind of problem by means of develop CRM is of great importance to strengthen 
global air transportation safety. In fact, it has been noticed in aviation industry already and it is the 
major factor to push forward the adoption of CRM. In order to communication in cockpit, a lot of 
books have been published as well as some principles including “double check” and “being most 
conservative”. Through analysis, “one ballot veto” principle was promoted by us and illustrated as the 
follows:  
 
Fig.1 fatal accidents and onboard fatalities by phase of flight (1997-2006) 
Analysis on Causes to These Problems 
Due to some deficiency of CRM, the flight crew is unable to prevent the accident at critical 
moment by interrupting the accident chain, which is usually divided into two types: 
 
 
 
1）Captain doesn’t accept safety recommendations from F/O or warning system, for examples 
of the two accidents mentioned in the first part. 
2）For some reason, crew member doesn’t express any fear or objection to captain’s wrong 
decision or action.  
Most of the cases belong to type 1, since type 2 is an extreme situation rarely occurred 
nevertheless more serious and hard to deal with. The following factors are found to be the causes of 
the problem. 
Personal Attitude of Crew Members 
The study showed that one of the main causes to CRM problem is the inappropriate personal 
attitude of the crew. 
1）Inappropriate personal attitude of captain: 
 Autarchy; 
 Actuation; 
 Overconfidence; 
 Show-off. 
Being an absolute leader in the cockpit, the captain is likely to regard any safety advice by any 
other crew member as a challenge to his authority or interruption to his order so that respond in a 
negative and autarchical behavior. Some captains are so overconfident that they don’t think any 
mistake he or she could make as well as any disaster could happen to them. Besides, someone may 
take a risk to show his power and boldness [6]. It is often to find these improper attitudes in the cockpit 
with two captains. More and more rule violation cases are found in the cockpit due to improper 
competition or struggle led by overconfidence. Moreover, as an operator, some captains intend to 
control everything and take immediate response to any situation which often resulted in a rush action. 
Usually, the best way to handle emergency situation is to go around instead of trying to land, 
unfortunately, go around is regarded as “being incapable to perform” among lots of the pilots. 
2）Inappropriate attitude of F/O: 
 In awe of authority; 
 In fear of make mistake; 
 Irresponsible; 
 Usual assumption. 
On the contrary to the captain’s attitude, other crew members are possibly passive and take no 
action to the captain’s dangerous operation at critical moment. Being a F/O, he or she is probably 
hesitant to give any negative comments when flying with an experienced and capable captain. Even if 
they point out the captain’s errors, they would like to use some mild words. For example, being a 
trainee, the F/O would not tell a captain the final approach speed is 15knots slower than required, on 
the other hand, he or she may say that “the speed seems a little bit slow” or in even more polite way by 
reminding the captain of “wind shear may be encountered”, which are dangerous rather than 
ineffective since it may screen the severity. To take over control of the aircraft from the captain is 
supposed even more difficult, simply because the F/O have to worry about losing his job. 
Training on CRM 
How to improve communication in the cockpit is covered by CRM training syllabus, but up to 
now, no effective training course is set up targeted to help the captain abandon his or her stubbornness 
 
 
 
at the urgent moment. Why haven’t these problems been worked out effectively? It is found that the 
main reason is that the captain in the cockpit is over-authorized and at an ultimate leadership. Of 
course, the existing power unbalanced reality is the exact reason for putting forward the concept of 
CRM, but it is a pity that no effective solution is achieved. How does the crew make a safety 
beneficial decision at crucial point? When is the proper time for the F/O to extend his worries on 
safety issue or how to put forward his argument against the captain? When shall the F/O take the 
control actively so as to ensure safety? All of these questions are required to be considered in CRM 
training courses. 
Regulations and Standards 
Actually, there is specific instruction on when to go around or abort taking off in flight rules or 
standards currently in force. In accordance with REASON theory, the operator of the aircraft is the last 
safety defense line. However, it is impossible for a human being to make no mistake. For a variety of 
reason, the operator may ignore some regulations helpful for safety and take a risky action. 
Additionally, the current regulations and standards on going around and take-off abortion are focused 
on technical point of view as well as there is no particular explanation on how to ensure its 
implementation and what kind of rights could support the F/O. 
Cultural Features 
It the social culture to lead the F/O are easily obey the authority and seldom resist, moreover, 
the control column is in the hand of the captain[7]. This phenomenon is very common, especially in 
Asian area, just because the social or national culture is in favor to the person with superiority and 
power. Meanwhile, the Asian people are more easily to accept the social estate and power inequality in 
their daily life which eventually facilitate autarchical habit built by the powerful one, which make it 
hardly possible to overcome the authority limitation for the junior and object the instruction from the 
senior even if in case of emergency. It is not so bad in western countries. 
Advocate “One Ballot Veto” and Improve CRM 
Creating strong CRM is the basis for safety assurance. Scientific and reasonable CRM is very 
helpful to maintain the control of the aircraft in bad condition, which is the first priority to ensure 
safety. On the basis of the above analysis, the principle of “one ballot veto” is advocated so as to 
improve CRM, prevent those evitable accidents from happening and enhance aviation safety in China. 
Definition of “One Ballot Veto” 
The principle of “one ballot veto” refers that the captain should accept advice and take 
immediate action once any member of the crew (including flight crew or ATC controllers) shows 
uncertainty or objection to continue current operation (i.e. take-off, approach and landing) and 
provides recommendations favorable to flight control and safety (i.e. abort take-off, maintain altitude 
or go around) according to relative rules and standards. It is initiated basing on the guideline of “safety 
first” always implemented in China civil aviation. The main purpose for the initiative is to drive high 
attention paid on any safety advice or disagreement during flight and choose the safest plan at some 
critical phases. Two circumstances are listed, firstly, during the final approach, in case of any condition 
be harmful to control or safety, one of the crew member suggests to give up approach (go around) i.e. 
oppose to take on a risk of approaching to a final landing, the captain must go around. Secondly, 
before take-off, if some crew member has any doubt on safety, the captain must abort take-off and 
check it. 
 
 
 
Function of “One Ballot Veto” 
The principle of “one ballot veto” may contribute to improve CRM in several aspects; 
At critical time, it is very helpful for the crew to make a safety beneficial decision, take an 
action accordingly and interrupt the accident chain so that the accident would not happen, as it is 
demonstrated by case 3 and case 4 in appendix. Suppose the aircraft is at low level or some emergency 
situation occurred, it may make the situation worse if the crew’s attentions are distracted by arguing 
which method is more economical or simple, or the captain sticks on his own opinion deliberately for 
showing his flying skill. It will be improved if the principle of “one ballot veto” is implemented in a 
proper way and safety will be enhanced. 
The principle will contribute to train the crew members to get into the habit of good 
communication, which in return protect the captain against being dogmatic and stubborn for a variety 
of reason as well as relieve the F/O’s tension to “say no”. Besides, it will assist the crew members 
better understand their own roles and duties and dedicate to flight safety. 
It will be of great support to carry out the guideline of “Safety First” and establish more active 
cockpit atmosphere and reporting culture. 
Conclusions and Suggestions 
Through the above analysis, it is concluded that the principle of “one ballot veto” does play an 
active role in solving the problem related to CRM discussed in the paper. It is believed that nobody 
will query or disagree the captain’s decision and action without any reason. Once some other voice is 
heard, it must be for the purpose of flight safety assurance instead of challenging the captain’s 
authority. As far as it is concerned, the captain has dual responsibilities, one for controlling the aircraft, 
another for collecting team members’ opinions and making a final decision. Therefore, rather than 
destroy the captain’s authority and deprive his decision making right, advocating “one ballot veto” will 
certainly improve CRM, build up favorable safety culture and encourage the captain to accept more 
reliable measures suggested and avoid accident at critical fight phases. Meanwhile, it should be 
clarified that the principle does not mean anyone could take a measure immediately without the 
captain’s approval once he or she propose some safety advice, otherwise, it will go to another extreme. 
In order to implement the principle of “one ballot veto” correctly, improve CRM and enhance 
flight safety, it is strongly recommended to do the followings: 
1）Further research should be conducted to distinguish those factors harmful to successful 
CRM and find different solutions. The current flight rules and standards should be revised so as to 
specify the conditions applicable to the principle as well as corresponding implementation directory 
and authority necessary should be made. 
2）Strengthen CRM training by increasing more cases study to assist the pilots realizing the 
severity of the problems and educate them to be able to prevent the accident by taking the advantage 
of the principle, especially in case of emergency. It is very important to help them to recognize “once 
the approaching is not successful, going around quickly may be the last chance for evading accident. 
During approach to landing, if you are not sure of current situation and confident with the safety of 
continuing to land, you’d better not to take any adventure and go around immediately since it is 
probably the last opportunity to replace the accident report by the reporting of “it is the worst approach 
I have ever done”. On the other hand, CRM training course should cover the responsibility and action 
taken by the other crew members once they observe any decision threatening safety by the captain. It 
is necessary to require pilots understanding the accidents involving human factors discussed herein 
and set up guides about when and how to take the control from the captain so as to prevent accident. 
 
 
 
3）Relative reporting system should be established to encourage pilots provide written reports if 
they find any decision obviously endanger safe operation. Penalty regulations should be published for 
punishing those captains clinging on their action threatening safety.  
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